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Abstract 
Optimism biases denote the tendency to see future desirable events as being more likely to happen to 
oneself than undesirable events. Such biases are important for mental health and may extend to other 
individuals or social groups (social optimism biases). However, little is known about whether social 
optimism biases relate to brain structure. Using sparse canonical correlation analysis, we associated 
cortical thickness (assessed by magnetic resonance imaging) with measures of social and personal 
optimism bias, trait optimism, and related concepts. We identified a defensive self-enhancement 
dimension that associated significantly and reliably with the cortical thickness of the insula and inferior 
frontal cortex. This self-enhancement dimension included unfavorable biases toward unpopular out-
groups and indicators of personal optimism and pessimism. A shared biological substrate underlying 
future expectancies that subserves the promotion of the self and the denigration of unpopular out-groups 
may render society-wide efforts to counteract stereotyping particularly difficult: Such efforts may hinder 
the establishment of adaptive personal optimism biases.   
Key words: social optimism bias, cortical thickness, gray matter, MRI, stereotyping 
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Introduction 
Optimism bias can be defined as the tendency to expect positive outcomes to be more likely than negative 
outcomes (Krizan and Windschitl, 2007; Lench and Ditto, 2008; Lench and Bench, 2012; Dricu et al., 
2018). Most people display exaggerated optimism about their own future. This self-centered 
overoptimism has been termed optimism bias in the literature (Windschitl and Stuart, 2015) and has been 
suggested as a prerequisite for mental health (Trimmer, 2016). Interestingly, such unrealistic optimism 
extends toward in-groups and individuals that one evaluates positively or identifies with (we refer to this 
extension of optimism toward others as social optimism bias). Accordingly, sports fans are overly 
optimistic about their favorite team winning the game (Price, 2000; Aue et al., 2012), and voters 
overestimate the chances of their preferred political candidate winning elections (Babad, 1997).  
While there is a general tendency toward unrealistic optimism in the population, there is also 
interindividual variability in optimism bias and its related concepts. For instance, an individual’s 
readiness to display (social) optimism bias is likely influenced by dispositional optimism, a relatively 
stable disposition of having an optimistic yet not necessarily unrealistic life orientation (Radcliffe and 
Klein, 2002; Shepperd et al., 2015). Correspondingly, one may expect some overlap in neural correlates 
between personal and social optimism biases. Personal optimism biases and trait optimism have been 
linked to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brain 
regions involved in self-referential processing and stimulus valuation (Blair et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et 
al., 2016). Interestingly, activation of the aforementioned regions is also enhanced while an individual 
deliberates over in-group members (Volz et al., 2009; Cikara et al., 2017). Beyond these regions, the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and insula have been associated with 
personal optimism bias (Blair et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2016). Finally, the sole functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) study that focused on social optimism bias identified similar regions: Social 
optimism bias in American football fans was characterized by enhanced positive connectivity between the 
primary visual cortex on the one hand, and the insula, PCC, and striatum on the other (Aue et al., 2012). 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
4 
 
Whether and how unrealistic optimism manifests toward out-group members depends on the 
stereotypical characteristics assigned to them. When specifying the likelihood of different events 
happening to both in-group characters and different out-group characters, participants revealed equally 
strong optimism biases toward the in-group as they did toward an out-group that was perceived as warm 
but low competent (i.e. elderly persons; (Dricu et al., 2018)). By contrast, an out-group that was perceived 
as cold and competent (i.e. businesspersons) was associated with substantially reduced social optimism 
bias. Finally, the effect was flipped into pessimism bias toward an out-group that was perceived as most 
distant from our participants and was also cold and low competent (i.e. alcoholic persons). A similar 
study (Dricu et al., 2020) that used the same student sample as in the present study but that focused on 
brain activation has linked the vmPFC/ACC and the PCC to differences in social optimism biases 
between the in-group and three different types of out-groups (elderly persons, businesspersons, and 
alcoholic persons, representing progressing social distance; cf. Dricu et al., 2018). Biases toward out-
groups also correlated with activation in the insula and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). 
Anatomical characteristics of brain structures involved in optimism bias and associated concepts 
have just started to be identified. Trait optimism, for instance, has been linked to increased volume of the 
left OFC, thalamus (Dolcos et al., 2016), and parahippocampus (Yang et al., 2013). Associations between 
brain structure and expressions of social optimism bias have not yet been investigated, and little is known 
about the relationship between personal optimism bias and brain structure. Studies on optimistic belief 
update bias may come closest. This type of bias refers to the phenomenon whereby people more readily 
update likelihood estimates in response to favorable rather than unfavorable feedback regarding their 
personal future (thus it is related to personal optimism bias). Chowdhury and colleagues (Chowdhury et 
al., 2014) found that ACC volume in healthy older adults, but not among younger adults, correlated with 
the magnitude of optimistic update bias. Furthermore, white matter connectivity from the IFG and the 
insula to the subcortex was associated with the size of the belief update bias (Moutsiana et al., 2015).  
In summary, in the literature on personal optimistic bias, the insula, the ACC, and the IFG stand 
out as those regions most reliably associated with personal optimism bias (Harris and Fiske, 2007; Sharot 
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et al., 2007; Gozzi et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2009; Lamm et al., 2011; Sharot et al., 2012; Blair et al., 
2013; Marcoux et al., 2013; Blair et al., 2017; Kuzmanovic et al., 2018; Dricu et al., 2020). They are also 
implicated in social group perception (Krill and Platek, 2009; Hein et al., 2010; Harris and Fiske, 2011; 
Scheepers et al., 2013) and are therefore most likely to be involved in social optimism bias. 
Given the impact of likelihood estimations in social contexts on some of our most important 
decisions (e.g. with whom to start a company), the lack of research on neural substrates of social forms of 
optimism bias represents an important shortcoming. While plastic, brain structures do not change as 
quickly as brain activations. If social optimism biases relied on particular brain structures, likely those 
biases would be hard to overcome, which should affect society at large. The present study, therefore, had 
three aims: (1) Identify potential gray matter correlates of different social optimism biases; (2) examine 
their overlap with personal optimism bias; and (3) examine the overlap between biases and related 
concepts (e.g. trait optimism). 
The task to measure social optimism biases asked student participants inside an MRI scanner to 
rate the likelihood that four gender-congruent fictional characters would experience a series of identical 
desirable and undesirable events. One character represented the in-group (student) and the other three 
characters (elderly, businessperson, alcoholic) represented out-groups of progressive social distance (cf. 
Dricu et al., 2018). We computed an optimism bias score for each of the four characters. Two characters 
were previously rated (Cuddy et al., 2007; Dricu et al., 2018) as being warm (e.g. relatable, friendly, 
honest) and two as being cold (e.g. unapproachable, unpredictable), allowing for the additional 
calculation of a warmth bias (i.e. social optimism bias for warm versus cold individuals). Another 
measure consisted of the magnitude of optimism biases across characters to determine the extent of 
overall biasing of social predictions. Figure 1 depicts all measures of social optimism bias included in this 
study. Together, the combination of these measures allowed us to estimate and quantify whether and how 
strongly different facets of social optimism biases are associated with cortical thickness. Because social 
optimism bias toward in-group members relies on identification processes, we hypothesized that the 
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regions identified in fMRI research on personal optimism bias and social optimism biases (i.e. 
vmPFC/ACC, PCC/precuneus, insula) are also structurally different in participants with strong versus 
small social optimism biases. In addition, we expected that regions implicated in the perception of social 
groups (insula, ACC, IFG, dorsomedial PFC [dmPFC], temporoparietal junction) might be involved. 
Because the task assesses social optimism biases, we wanted to complement our data set with 
measures of personal optimism bias, trait optimism, and other measures potentially associated with social 
optimism bias (see Methods section for details). Measuring these related concepts allowed us to quantify 
their expression in brain structures as related to that of social optimism biases. Specifically, we were 
interested in finding out whether personal and social forms of optimism bias relied on the same brain 
structures, wherefore we added a measure of personal optimism (and pessimism) bias and a measure of 
trait optimism. In addition, we wanted to account for concepts that may be related but not identical to 
optimism. In that regard, we also measured the sensitivity of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and 
the behavioral activation system (BAS), which describe the regulation of behavior in response to 
punishment and reward, respectively (Carver and White, 1994; Strobel et al., 2001). Both systems might 
be closely associated with social forms of optimism bias (even though correlations with personal forms of 
optimism have been reported to be negative and moderate for inhibition (De Pascalis et al., 2013)). This is 
because the predicted social outcomes may be evaluated with respect to the self and thereby perceived as 
either rewarding or threatening (Cuddy et al., 2007). Other concepts of relevance were emotion regulation 
strategies such as suppression and reappraisal (measured by the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; 
ERQ), both of which appear to interact with dispositional optimism for the interpretation of ambiguous 
information (Gordon et al., 2016). Such an association might extend to the social context. Finally, we also 
included general affect (measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]; (Watson et 
al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996)), self-esteem (Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale [RSES]; (Rosenberg, 1965; 
Von Collani and Herzberg.Y, 2003)), and the Big-5 personality dimensions (Rammstedt and John, 2007), 
all of which might potentially affect likelihood estimations regarding success in others or oneself. 
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To achieve all of our aims, in terms of statistics we used sparse canonical correlation analysis 
(sCCA; see also Methods and Supplementary Information). This method uses an algorithm to assess the 
association between the different optimism measures (i.e. the non-imaging data) one the one hand and the 
different cortical thickness measures on the other. For this, the algorithm groups variables from either side 
into dimensions (modes). It also assigns weights to the variables constituting each mode in order to 
determine their respective contributions to the overall association between the non-imaging data and gray 
matter thickness.  
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-nine healthy participants (20 male, age: M = 23.1 years; SD = 4.0 years; range = 19–36) were 
recruited at the University of Bern via e-mails, flyers, and the local participant pool at the university. 
Participants were recruited in the context of a project on optimism biases, the fMRI-related parts of which 
were analyzed and described in a separate paper (Dricu et al., 2020). Here, we focus on brain structure 
instead of brain activation. Self-reported neurological disorders, mental disorders, MRI contraindications, 
use of psychoactive substances, and left-handedness served as exclusion criteria. Participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and were reimbursed with course credits or 25 Swiss francs per hour. One 
participant was excluded because of the clearly reduced quality of segmentation as indicated by 
Computational Anatomy Toolbox (CAT 12) algorithms. One participant was excluded for failure to 
complete the questionnaires. The final analyses were performed on 47 participants. 
 
Method 
Questionnaires: Using an online portal, participants filled out a number of questionnaire measures (see 
Supplementary Table S1A) prior to scanning. These measures included a sociodemographic 
questionnaire, the German version of the Comparative Optimism Scale (COS; measuring self-related 
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future expectancies as compared with those for others; (Weinstein, 1980)), the Revised Life Orientation 
Test (LOT-R, measuring trait optimism; (Scheier et al., 1994; Glaesmer et al., 2008)), the ERQ (assessing 
different emotion regulation strategies, e.g. reappraisal and suppression; (Abler and Kessler, 2009)), the 
PANAS (assessing current affective state; (Watson et al., 1988; Krohne et al., 1996)), the 10-item Big 
Five Inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2007), the Behavioral Inhibition System and Behavioral Activation 
System Scales (BIS/BAS; measuring behavioral inhibition and behavioral approach; (Carver and White, 
1994; Strobel et al., 2001)), and RSES (assessing personal self-esteem; (Rosenberg, 1965; Von Collani 
and Herzberg.Y, 2003)).  
Social optimism bias task: The social optimism bias task required participants to give likelihood estimates 
for four fictional characters experiencing 16 desirable and 16 undesirable events (see Supplementary 
Figure S1 and Supplementary Table S2). Because of previous suggestions that perceived frequency and 
controllability of an event may be linked to altered optimism biases (Horswill and McKenna, 1999; 
Chambers et al., 2003; Klar and Ayal, 2004), we used validated events from a previous study (Dricu et 
al., 2018). Using a different sample and no brain imaging but the same stimuli and task as the present 
study, that study assessed events through ratings of perceived controllability (high and low) and perceived 
frequency (frequent and rare) with respect to the general population and ensured that they were matched 
across conditions (i.e. desirable and undesirable). Overall, 128 situations were created to reflect each 
character in each of the 32 events. Each trial started with a random-duration fixation cross (1.5 s to 3 s), 
followed by a screen containing the target scenario. Scenarios consisted of a still animation in the middle 
of the screen, as well as a short description of the target event and a visual analog scale ranging from 0% 
to 100% at the bottom of the screen (see Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure 1). The trials were displayed 
in a pseudorandomized order (Latin square), divided into four acquisition blocks of 7 min. 
The four animated characters represented social groups that would map onto each quadrant of the 
warmth-competence two-dimensional space as specified in the Stereotype Content Model (Cuddy et al., 
2011; Fiske, 2015). A previous study that used the same characters had shown that students and elderly 
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persons were indeed perceived as being warmer than businesspersons and alcoholic persons. Furthermore, 
students and businesspeople were perceived as being more competent than elderly persons and alcoholic 
persons (Dricu et al., 2018). Because we sampled student participants, the student character served as an 
implicit in-group character (i.e. perceived as being high in warmth and high in competence (Harris et al., 
2000; Reynolds et al., 2000; Hogg and Reid, 2006)). Three other – previously validated – characters 
represented out-groups: an elderly person (high warmth/low competence), a businessperson (high 
competence/low warmth), and an alcoholic person (low warmth/low competence). Thirty-two 
backgrounds pertinent to the target events were created onto which the four characters were carefully 
cropped by aligning size and position. All characters, backgrounds, and scenarios were created by using 
The Sims 4 (Electronic Arts, CA, USA). Stimuli were matched in brightness and contrast. The social 
optimism bias task was programmed with E-Prime 2.0 Professional (version 2.0.10.353; Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Female participants saw female animated characters and male 
participants viewed male animated characters. 
Experimental procedure and MRI scan: Data collection took place at the Insel University Hospital of 
Bern, Switzerland. Participants first received a short booklet regarding the alleged nature of the study. 
The communicated purpose of the study was the investigation of the capacity to adequately think about 
the future. All procedures were approved by the ethics commission of the canton of Bern, Switzerland. 
After signing the consent form according to the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki, participants 
were placed inside the scanner.  
MRI scans were conducted on a Siemens Magnetom Prisma scanner with a 64-channel head coil. 
The structural scan consisted of a T1-weighted protocol that acquired 160 interleaved slices, with a 1-mm 
isotropic spatial resolution, echo time of 2.98 ms, TR of 2.3 s, TI of 0.9 s, flip angle of 9 degrees, and 
field of view of 256×256×160 mm.  
 
Analysis 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
10 
 
Optimism bias task: We first engaged in data cleaning. The optimism bias task data of three participants 
who consistently gave extremely high or low (99% or 1%) or medium (50%) values were not considered. 
Medium values were excluded because 50% was the default value, and non-answers would have been 
registered as 50%. Thus, the default 50% value could reflect either genuine assessments of likelihood 
estimates or nonresponding. The present exclusion procedure accords with the methods of a previous 
study that identified participants whose proportion of such answers was more than three standard 
deviations above the average of the sample  (Dricu et al., 2018). Approximately 1% of the trials from the 
remaining participants comprised no answer and were therefore excluded as well.  
Next, we computed eight task measures for each participant (see Figure 1, Supplementary Table 
S1A). We averaged the likelihood estimates for desirable events across all characters (1), and did the 
same for undesirable events (2). We then estimated the optimism bias for each character (3-6) by (a) z-
standardizing all likelihood values (across characters) within each participant and (b) subsequently 
computing the difference in likelihood estimates between desirable and undesirable events. In addition, 
we computed a warmth bias (7) by adding the optimism biases for the student and elderly characters and 
subtracting those of the businessperson and alcoholic characters. Finally, we computed the overall bias 
magnitude across characters (8) by adding the optimism biases for the student, elderly, and 
businessperson characters, plus the inverted bias for the alcoholic character (as it was opposite in 
direction to the other biases in the vast majority of participants). 
fMRI preprocessing and data extraction: MRI data were preprocessed and analyzed by using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping 12 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB R2017b (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA, 
USA). We determined cortical thickness with the CAT 12 toolbox, following the workflow specified in 
Dahnke et al. (Dahnke et al., 2013). We then extracted the mean cortical thickness for 62 regions (see 
Supplementary Table S1B) defined in the Desikan-Killany-Tourville 40 atlas (Desikan et al., 2006; Klein 
and Tourville, 2012). We chose the measure of cortical thickness by using the DKT atlas in this 
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parcellation because we deemed it a good compromise in terms of statistical power and regional 
granularity (spatial resolution) across the entire cortex. Analyses were performed on UBELIX 
(https://ubelix.unibe.ch/docs), the high-performance computing cluster at the University of Bern. 
(Sparse) canonical correlation analysis: In order to associate the cortical thickness and the non-imaging 
data sets, we used a CCA that permits correlations between the variables within the two data sets. The 
purpose of CCA is to inform whether one data set associates with another. CCA specifies linear 
combinations (pairs of canonical variates) of variables in Data set 1 (non-imaging data) and variables in 
Data set 2 (cortical thickness data) that best express the maximal correlation (i.e. canonical correlation) 
between the two data sets. The correlations between the canonical variates are the canonical correlations. 
CCA can be considered a generalization of multiple linear regression with the advantage that it allows the 
combination of two data sets rather than a data set with one outcome variable. Our CCA approach used an 
L1 penalty function that does not assume that the variables within the two data sets are uncorrelated 
(Witten et al., 2009).   
We applied sCCA (meaning that the weights of some variables can be zero) because this 
permitted the inclusion of more variables than participants, but also because sCCA allows for stronger 
inferences regarding the contribution of individual variables (for further explanation of this and similar 
approaches, see (Moser et al., 2017; Moser et al., 2018)). More in-depth description of the sCCA methods 
used can be found in the Supplementary Information.  
We calculated the first 10 sCCA modes (components) to determine the variance explained. In 
short, each mode is the algorithm’s ideal representation of both data sets when the goal is to correlate 
Data set 1 linearly with Data set 2. Every mode is therefore represented by two variates: one that 
represents Data set 1 and one that represents Data set 2. Each mode does so without taking into account 
the variance explained by all previous modes. Therefore, the explained variance tends to get smaller with 
each subsequent mode. In (over-)simplified terms, a mode is essentially the equivalent of a factor in a 
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factor analysis or a component in an independent component analysis, except that it takes two data sets 
simultaneously into account in order to create the modes.  
Following the calculation of those 10 modes, we then restricted permutations and reliability 
analysis to the first seven modes, as they cumulatively explained more than 99% of the variance, meaning 
that any potentially explained variance by the remaining modes would have been small. We determined 
significance by using 10,000 permutations of the data set. For all modes, the threshold for statistical 
significance was set at p < 0.05. Next, for each mode, we extracted the weights of the variables 
contributing to both variates and reported variables with weights of more than 0.2 in the main text (and 
the others only in the Supplementary Data File, which is available at 
https://github.com/domamo/Supplementaries-Social-optimism-biases-are-associated-with-cortical-
thickness). For those non-imaging measures whose contribution was in the top five significant modes, we 
performed post hoc correlations between the individual measures with cortical thickness across all 62 
regions (corrected for height, weight, body mass index, age, and sex) and we present regions that showed 
an uncorrected p < 0.001.  
Reliability analyses: To ascertain that the sample size was adequate and that results from the sCCA were 
indeed reliable, we conducted three additional analyses, which are detailed more precisely in the 
Supplementary Information (Reliability Analysis section). In short, the reliability analysis included the 
following:  
1. Leave-one-out analyses for each participant.  
2a. Training-test set analyses. We randomly split the sample in half 10,000 times (resampling), performed 
sCCA on each of these training sets, and then applied the identified weights from each training set to the 
other half of the sample.  
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2b. Mean and standard deviation of the redundancy-reliability score (RR-score) for each mode. The RR-
score is a measure of the stability of the variable-to-variate correlations and essentially measures whether 
test sets have similar associations between variables and variates (Moser, 2018; Moser et al., 2018).  
3. We tested whether the sample size was adequate or would give rise to gross overfitting.  
Post hoc Analyses: For the interested reader, we also provide uncorrected Pearson correlations between 
all non-imaging variables, including correlations of these variables with the sCCA variates of the first 
seven modes. The results can be found as part of the Supplementary Data File.  
Results 
In line with a previous study (Dricu et al., 2018), the optimism biases were similarly positive for 
the student and the elderly characters, less positive for the businessperson, and negative for the alcoholic 
character (see Figure 2).  
Sparse Canonical Correlation Analysis 
In terms of statistical inference for sCCA, the correlation between the non-imaging data and the 
cortical thickness variates reached significance for three modes: the first (r = 0.73, p = 0.0275), the second 
(r = 0.76, p = 0.0246), and the sixth (r = 0.78, p = 0.0185) modes. The remaining modes were not 
significant and are therefore not presented in the main manuscript (see Supplementary Data File). 
Numerous non-imaging variables contributed to Mode 1. Among variables emerging from the 
task, the warmth bias contributed positively toward the non-imaging variate (weight = 0.37), while the 
optimism biases for the alcoholic (-0.37) and the businessperson characters (-0.25) and the magnitude of 
the optimism bias (-0.22) contributed negatively to the non-imaging variate. Among questionnaire scales, 
the BAS (0.34) and the BIS (0.23), the COS Optimism (0.29), the PANAS Positive (0.25), the BFI 
Neuroticism (0.21) and Conscientiousness (0.20), and the ERQ Suppression (0.20) contributed positively 
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to the non-imaging variate, while only the COS Pessimism subscale (-0.22) contributed negatively to the 
non-imaging variate (see Figure 3, Table 1, Supplementary Figure S4, and the Supplementary Data File).  
Cortical thickness measures that contributed to the Mode 1 variate included the left insula (weight 
= 0.70), the right (0.48) and the left (0.27) IFG (pars opercularis), the left superior frontal gyrus (0.27) 
and the caudal middle frontal gyrus (0.24), and the right precentral gyrus (0.22; Figure 3).  
Task variables that contributed positively to the Mode 2 non-imaging variate included the overall 
magnitude of the social optimism bias (weight = 0.41), and the average likelihood given to desirable 
(0.29) and undesirable (0.21) events. The businessperson optimism bias contributed negatively (-0.36) to 
the Mode 2 variate. Among questionnaire scales, the COS Pessimism (0.39), PANAS negative (0.25), 
ERQ Reappraisal (0.24), BFI Neuroticism (0.23), and RSES (0.20) contributed positively to the Mode 2 
non-imaging variate (Table 1, Supplementary Figures S1 and S3, and the Supplementary Data Set). 
Cortical thickness measures that contributed positively to the Mode 2 non-imaging variate 
included the right rostral ACC (weight = 0.56), the PCC on both the left (isthmus: 0.53, above corpus 
callosum: 0.29) and the right (isthmus: 0.40) sides, and the caudal ACC (0.31); the right paracentral gyrus 
(-0.24) contributed negatively (Supplementary Figure S2).  
Task variables that contributed positively to the Mode 6 non-imaging variate included student 
(weight= 0.37) and elderly optimism biases (0.22). Among questionnaires, the RSES (0.27) contributed 
positively, while the COS Pessimism (-0.45), BIS (-0.40), LOT Pessimism (-0.35), and BFI 
Conscientiousness (-0.25) contributed negatively to the Mode 6 non-imaging variate (Table 1,  
Supplementary Figures S2 and S3, and Supplementary Data File). 
All cortical thickness measures that contributed toward the Mode 6 non-imaging variate were 
located in the left hemisphere. The IFG (pars triangularis, weight = 0.66), the entorhinal gyrus (0.59), and 
the transverse temporal gyrus (0.24) contributed positively, while the only region that contributed 
negatively was the caudal middle frontal gyrus (-0.27).  
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Reliability analyses 
More in-depth description of the reliability analyses results can be found in the supplementary online 
materials. In short, we found that the leave-one-out approach indicated no high likelihood of outlier-
dominated results. Test sets and RR-scores indicated high reliability for Mode 1 and reduced and low 
reliability for Modes 2 and 6, respectively. Sample size testing revealed only marginal overfitting, which 
indicates that the present sample size is sufficient to give reliable results with the present analysis (see 
Supplementary Figure S5). 
Discussion 
In accordance with our aims, sCCA analysis indicated that (1) there were indeed gray matter thickness 
correlates of social optimism biases, (2) that these gray matter correlates of social optimism bias may 
partially overlap with similar correlates of personal optimism bias, and (3) that there may be an interplay 
between the cortical gray matter correlate of optimism biases and related concepts. Specifically, we 
identified three sCCA modes that significantly related cortical thickness to measures of social and 
personal optimism bias and related concepts. On a general level, optimistic measures mostly contributed 
positively to Mode 1, while pessimism contributed negatively. Given that optimism (bias) has been linked 
to task persistence (Tenney et al., 2015) and lack of it is associated with pathologies centered around 
motivational problems (Garrett et al., 2014), Mode 1 cortical thickness could hence reflect preconditions 
for personal functionality and initiative. Consistent with this interpretation, both personal optimism bias 
(COS Optimism) and behavioral activation system sensitivity were characterized by positive weights on 
the Mode 1 cortical thickness variate.  
Interestingly, regarding social optimism biases, the more negative the biases for the two “cold” 
characters (businessperson and alcoholic), the greater the cortical thickness of these participants in brain 
regions identified with Mode 1. In that context, it is unsurprising that the bias difference for warm versus 
cold out-groups (i.e. the warmth bias) was also positively associated with cortical thickness. Thus, the 
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businessperson and alcoholic character optimism biases were more similar to comparative pessimism than 
optimism (i.e. personal pessimism rather than optimism bias as measured with the COS) on this mode. 
This observation can be easily reconciled with findings suggesting that processes that act to decrease the 
impact of potentially self-threatening materials are involved in this mode, as suggested by the positive 
contribution of the BIS, trait neuroticism, and the habitual tendency to suppress negative experiences. In 
combination, these effects hence allow us to argue that measures related to self-defense (e.g. emotional 
suppression and trait neuroticism) may be intimately linked with social optimism/pessimism. Considering 
that the misfortune of others can be used to protect and enhance an individual’s self-views (van Dijk et 
al., 2011), the Mode 1 findings could reflect a downsize of future possibilities of distant social out-groups 
as a boost to perceived self-efficacy. Alternatively, given the potential clinical implications of lower 
weight measures such as neuroticism, behavioral inhibition, emotion suppression, and conscientiousness, 
one could interpret Mode 1 as a larger and potentially clinically relevant dimension that links the 
avoidance of potential dangers to self-esteem with basic personality dimensions and social 
optimism/pessimism measures.  
The greatest contributor of the Mode 1 thickness variate was the insula, whose functionality has 
previously been related to optimistic belief updating (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016) and comparative 
optimism (Blair et al., 2013) and thus the preservation of positive personal future-directed expectancies. 
The present study extends these findings by indicating that the insula is not only functionally but also 
structurally associated with a dimension across a wide spectrum of optimism bias measures, including 
primarily social biases. We further observed that the brain regions contributing to Mode 1 largely overlap 
with those found by fMRI and white matter connectivity studies on optimistic belief updating (Sharot et 
al., 2011; Moutsiana et al., 2015). Most important, using the present sample, fMRI analyses in the current 
experiment revealed striking commonalities between functional and structural aspects of the social 
optimism bias paradigm (Dricu et al., 2020). For instance, when participants assessed event likelihoods 
for the most distant out-groups (alcoholic character), brain activation differed from assessment of the in-
group in the dmPFC, as well as in the IFG pars orbitalis and triangularis (Dricu et al., 2020). In sum, the 
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functional literature suggests that the network associated with Mode 1 is primarily linked to self-serving 
(possibly partly defensive) responding, which is consistent with our interpretation of self-enhancing 
comparison processes being reflected in the Mode 1 variate (i.e. Mode 1 could be called a “defensive self-
enhancement dimension with a corresponding insula-inferior frontal cortex substrate”). 
The fact that personal biases (comparative optimism and pessimism) were on the same dimension 
in Mode 1 as social biases for unpopular out-groups (implying an increased likelihood of future 
misfortune) points toward these biases sharing a biological substrate. However, while this substrate may 
serve adaptive purposes in promoting biases related to the individual (e.g. necessary condition to keep up 
task engagement in novel or difficult tasks), it may also interfere with societal efforts aimed at reducing 
negative stereotyping. Consequently, modifying the magnitude of one type of optimism bias (either 
personal or social) in a desired direction (e.g. reducing negative stereotypes) may potentially lead to 
undesired consequences in the other bias (e.g. a reduction of individual optimism and associated task 
engagement). Because Mode 1 was not only significant but also highly reliable, this mode’s findings can 
be interpreted as having a strong impact. 
We also found significant, but less reliable, canonical correlations between the non-imaging 
measures and the cortical thickness for Modes 2 and 6, both of which are discussed in more detail in the 
supplementary online materials. In short, we interpret Mode 2 to represent a particularly dichotomized 
worldview, bereft of emotional ambiguity. Among other things, this is based on the fact that the overall 
magnitude of optimism biases was most strongly related to this mode: The larger the biases for the four 
characters, the greater the cortical thickness. The cortical thickness of Mode 2 pointed to multiple regions 
throughout the cingulum, which are crucial to both tracking of the stimuli’s subjective value and self-
referential processing (e.g. (Cox and Kable, 2014; Yoshimura et al., 2014)). Similar to Mode 1, Mode 2 
could be interpreted as being linked to protection of self-value (i.e. Mode 2 could be called a “black-and-
white valence dimension with a corresponding midline-cingulate substrate”). In Mode 2, however, this 
would partly be achieved by increasing the influence of affective (perceived warmth) over cognitive 
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(perceived competence) information when evaluating events happening to others with a mixed status (i.e. 
the businessperson; (Fiske, 2012)).  
Mode 6 pointed uniformly to left-sided brain regions and was linked to reduced pessimism and 
inhibition, but increased optimism biases for members of the in-group and warm out-groups. Like Mode 1 
and Mode 2, Mode 6 could be interpreted as relating to the protection of self-value, but with yet another 
underlying process, that is, by an irrationally strong belief that good things will happen to oneself, the in-
group, and close out-groups, while ignoring possibilities for undesirable events to occur to these 
individuals (i.e. Mode 6 could hence be called a “generalized positivity dimension with a corresponding 
left hemisphere substrate”). Because this mode seems to neglect biases related to disliked out-groups, it 
can be considered as (a) reflecting more self-centered (i.e. personal and related to close others) processes 
than the two other modes, and (b) coding positive social aspects of optimism biases. 
One limitation of the present study is its correlational approach, implying that we cannot assess 
causality (i.e. whether variations in social optimism biases and related concepts influence cortical 
thickness or vice versa). A second limitation is that while Modes 2 and 6 were significant, their 
reliabilities were limited and need to be replicated. Thus, findings from these two modes should be used 
for hypothesis generation rather than seen as stable findings.  
In conclusion, different facets of social optimism biases (as revealed by our three modes) are 
associated with increased cortical thickness in a network that includes the left insula, bilateral IFG, and 
dmPFC. Our data suggest that social optimism biases that discriminate against distant out-groups may, to 
a certain degree, rely on the same biological substrate as personal forms of optimism bias. Thus, a feeling 
of superiority may be biologically rooted and mediated by different processes: either by up-leveling 
oneself or by down-leveling disliked others. A mildly irrational optimistic belief in oneself compared with 
others appears to be healthy and a lack of it has been associated with psychopathology (Strunk et al., 
2006; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Blair et al., 2017; Dricu et al., in press). However, the 
present study indicates that this belief shares a biological substrate with social biases that can discriminate 
against out-groups. Brain structure – while plastic – does not change as quickly as brain functionality, 
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underscoring the long-term implications of the present findings. Such implications may well extend 
beyond neurocognition into fields more directly focused on society at large. Finally, in order to gain better 
insight into modification possibilities of the different biases, future studies will need to look at causality 
in the association between diverse facets of optimism and cortical thickness.  
 
  
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
20 
 
 
References 
Abler, B. & Kessler, H. (2009) 'Emotion Regulation Questionnaire -Eine deutschsprachige Fassung des 
ERQ von Gross und John.', Diagnostica, 55, pp. 142-152. 
Aue, T., Nusbaum, H. C. & Cacioppo, J. T. (2012) 'Neural correlates of wishful thinking', Soc Cogn Affect 
Neurosci, 7(8), pp. 991-1000. 
Babad, E. (1997) 'Wishful thinking among voters: Motivational and cognitive influences', International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 9(2), pp. 105-125. 
Blair, K. S., Otero, M., Teng, C., Geraci, M., Ernst, M., Blair, R., Pine, D. & Grillon, C. (2017) 'Reduced 
optimism and a heightened neural response to everyday worries are specific to generalized anxiety 
disorder, and not seen in social anxiety', Psychological medicine, 47(10), pp. 1806-1815. 
Blair, K. S., Otero, M., Teng, C., Jacobs, M., Odenheimer, S., Pine, D. S. & Blair, R. J. R. (2013) 'Dissociable 
roles of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) in value 
representation and optimistic bias', Neuroimage, 78, pp. 103-110. 
Carver, C. S. & White, T. L. (1994) 'Behavioral-Inhibition, Behavioral Activation, and Affective Responses 
to Impending Reward and Punishment - the Bis Bas Scales', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
67(2), pp. 319-333. 
Chambers, J. R., Windschitl, P. D. & Suls, J. (2003) 'Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative 
optimism: When what happens frequently is “more likely to happen to me”', Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 29(11), pp. 1343-1356. 
Chowdhury, R., Sharot, T., Wolfe, T., Düzel, E. & Dolan, R. J. (2014) 'Optimistic update bias increases in 
older age', Psychological medicine, 44(9), pp. 2003-2012. 
Cikara, M., Van Bavel, J. J., Ingbretsen, Z. A. & Lau, T. (2017) 'Decoding “us” and “them”: Neural 
representations of generalized group concepts', Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(5), p. 
621. 
Cox, K. M. & Kable, J. W. (2014) 'BOLD subjective value signals exhibit robust range adaptation', J 
Neurosci, 34(49), pp. 16533-16543. 
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T. & Glick, P. (2007) 'The BIAS map: behaviors from intergroup affect and 
stereotypes', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4), p. 631. 
Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P. & Beninger, A. (2011) 'The dynamics of warmth and competence judgments, and 
their outcomes in organizations', Research in Organizational Behavior, 31, pp. 73-98. 
Dahnke, R., Yotter, R. A. & Gaser, C. (2013) 'Cortical thickness and central surface estimation', 
Neuroimage, 65, pp. 336-348. 
De Pascalis, V., Cozzuto, G., Caprara, G. V. & Alessandri, G. (2013) 'Relations among EEG-alpha 
asymmetry, BIS/BAS, and dispositional optimism', Biol Psychol, 94(1), pp. 198-209. 
Desikan, R. S., Segonne, F., Fischl, B., Quinn, B. T., Dickerson, B. C., Blacker, D., Buckner, R. L., Dale, A. M., 
Maguire, R. P., Hyman, B. T., Albert, M. S. & Killiany, R. J. (2006) 'An automated labeling system for 
subdividing the human cerebral cortex on MRI scans into gyral based regions of interest', Neuroimage, 
31(3), pp. 968-980. 
Dolcos, S., Hu, Y., Iordan, A. D., Moore, M. & Dolcos, F. (2016) 'Optimism and the brain: trait optimism 
mediates the protective role of the orbitofrontal cortex gray matter volume against anxiety', Soc Cogn 
Affect Neurosci, 11(2), pp. 263-271. 
Dricu, M., Buhrer, S., Hesse, F., Eder, C., Posada, A. & Aue, T. (2018) 'Warmth and competence predict 
overoptimistic beliefs for out-group but not in-group members', PLoS One, 13(11), p. e0207670. 
Dricu, M., Kress, L. & Aue, T. (in press) 'The neurophysiological basis of optimism bias', in T. Aue & H. 
Okon-Singer (eds), Cognitive biases in health and psychiatric disorders., Elsevier. 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
21 
 
Dricu, M., Schupbach, L., Bristle, M., Wiest, R., Moser, D. A. & Aue, T. (2020) 'Group membership 
dictates the neural correlates of social optimism biases', Sci Rep, 10(1), p. 1139. 
Fiske, S. T. (2012) 'Managing ambivalent prejudices: smart-but-cold and warm-but-dumb stereotypes', 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 639(1), pp. 33-48. 
Fiske, S. T. (2015) 'Intergroup biases: A focus on stereotype content', Current Opinion in Behavioral 
Sciences, 3, pp. 45-50. 
Garrett, N., Sharot, T., Faulkner, P., Korn, C. W., Roiser, J. P. & Dolan, R. J. (2014) 'Losing the rose tinted 
glasses: neural substrates of unbiased belief updating in depression', Frontiers in human neuroscience, 8, 
p. 639. 
Glaesmer, H., Hoyer, J., Klotsche, J. & Herzberg, P. Y. (2008) 'Die deutsche Version des Life-Orientation-
Test (LOT-R) zum dispositionellen Optimismus und Pessimismus.', Zeitschrift für Gesundheitspsychologie, 
16, pp. 26-31. 
Gordon, N. S., Chesney, S. A. & Reiter, K. (2016) 'Thinking positively: Optimism and emotion regulation 
predict interpretation of ambiguous information', Cogent Psychology, 3. 
Gozzi, M., Raymont, V., Solomon, J., Koenigs, M. & Grafman, J. (2009) 'Dissociable effects of prefrontal 
and anterior temporal cortical lesions on stereotypical gender attitudes', Neuropsychologia, 47(10), pp. 
2125-2132. 
Harris, L. T. & Fiske, S. T. (2007) 'Social groups that elicit disgust are differentially processed in mPFC', 
Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci, 2(1), pp. 45-51. 
Harris, L. T. & Fiske, S. T. (2011) 'Dehumanized Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, 
Torture, and Genocide?', Z Psychol, 219(3), pp. 175-181. 
Harris, P., Middleton, W. & Joiner, R. (2000) 'The typical student as an in‐group member: eliminating 
optimistic bias by reducing social distance', European Journal of Social Psychology, 30(2), pp. 235-253. 
Hein, G., Silani, G., Preuschoff, K., Batson, C. D. & Singer, T. (2010) 'Neural responses to ingroup and 
outgroup members' suffering predict individual differences in costly helping', Neuron, 68(1), pp. 149-
160. 
Hogg, M. A. & Reid, S. A. (2006) 'Social identity, self‐categorization, and the communication of group 
norms', Communication Theory, 16(1), pp. 7-30. 
Horswill, M. S. & McKenna, F. P. (1999) 'The effect of perceived control on risk taking', Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 29(2), pp. 377-391. 
Klar, Y. & Ayal, S. (2004) 'Event frequency and comparative optimism: Another look at the indirect 
elicitation method of self-others risks', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(6), pp. 805-814. 
Klein, A. & Tourville, J. (2012) '101 labeled brain images and a consistent human cortical labeling 
protocol', Front Neurosci, 6, p. 171. 
Korn, C., Sharot, T., Walter, H., Heekeren, H. & Dolan, R. (2014) 'Depression is related to an absence of 
optimistically biased belief updating about future life events', Psychological medicine, 44(3), pp. 579-
592. 
Krill, A. & Platek, S. M. (2009) 'In-group and out-group membership mediates anterior cingulate 
activation to social exclusion', Front Evol Neurosci, 1, p. 1. 
Krizan, Z. & Windschitl, P. D. (2007) 'The influence of outcome desirability on optimism', Psychol Bull, 
133(1), pp. 95-121. 
Krohne, H. W., Egloff, B., Kohlmann, C. W. & A., T. (1996) 'Untersuchungen mit der deutechen Version 
"Positive and Negativee Affect Schedule" (PANAS)', Diagnostica, 42, pp. 139-156. 
Kuzmanovic, B., Jefferson, A. & Vogeley, K. (2016) 'The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-
referential optimistic belief updates', Neuroimage, 133, pp. 151-162. 
Kuzmanovic, B., Rigoux, L. & Tittgemeyer, M. (2018) 'Influence of vmPFC on dmPFC Predicts Valence-
Guided Belief Formation', Journal of Neuroscience, 38(37), pp. 7996-8010. 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
22 
 
Lamm, C., Decety, J. & Singer, T. (2011) 'Meta-analytic evidence for common and distinct neural 
networks associated with directly experienced pain and empathy for pain', Neuroimage, 54(3), pp. 2492-
2502. 
Lench, H. C. & Bench, S. W. (2012) 'Automatic optimism: Why people assume their futures will be 
bright', Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6(4), pp. 347-360. 
Lench, H. C. & Ditto, P. H. (2008) 'Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive 
and negative events', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), pp. 631-639. 
Marcoux, L. A., Michon, P. E., Voisin, J. I., Lemelin, S., Vachon-Presseau, E. & Jackson, P. L. (2013) 'The 
modulation of somatosensory resonance by psychopathic traits and empathy', Front Hum Neurosci, 7, p. 
274. 
Moser, D. A. (2018) 'Matlab code and example to calculate RR-score as related to Moser et al 2018', 
researchgate.org. 
Moser, D. A., Doucet, G. E., Ing, A., Dima, D., Schumann, G., Bilder, R. M. & Frangou, S. (2017) 'An 
integrated brain-behavior model for working memory', Mol Psychiatry. 
Moser, D. A., Doucet, G. E., Lee, W. H., Rasgon, A., Krinsky, H., Leibu, E., Ing, A., Schumann, G., Rasgon, 
N. & Frangou, S. (2018) 'Multivariate Associations Among Behavioral, Clinical, and Multimodal Imaging 
Phenotypes in Patients With Psychosis', JAMA Psychiatry, 75(4), pp. 386-395. 
Moutsiana, C., Charpentier, C. J., Garrett, N., Cohen, M. X. & Sharot, T. (2015) 'Human frontal–
subcortical circuit and asymmetric belief updating', Journal of Neuroscience, 35(42), pp. 14077-14085. 
Price, P. C. (2000) 'Wishful thinking in the prediction of competitive outcomes', Thinking & Reasoning, 
6(2), pp. 161-172. 
Radcliffe, N. M. & Klein, W. M. (2002) 'Dispositional, unrealistic, and comparative optimism: Differential 
relations with the knowledge and processing of risk information and beliefs about personal risk', 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(6), pp. 836-846. 
Rammstedt, B. & John, O. P. (2007) 'Measuring personality in one minute or less: A 10-item short 
version of  the Big Five Inventory in English and German', Journal of Research in Personality, 41(2007), 
pp. 203–212. 
Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C. & Haslam, S. A. (2000) 'When are we better than them and they worse than 
us? A closer look at social discrimination in positive and negative domains', Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78(1), p. 64. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965) Society and the adolescent selfimage, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 
Scheepers, D., Derks, B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Lelieveld, G. J., Van Nunspeet, F., Rombouts, S. A. & de Rover, 
M. (2013) 'The neural correlates of in-group and self-face perception: is there overlap for high 
identifiers?', Front Hum Neurosci, 7, p. 528. 
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S. & Bridges, M. W. (1994) 'Distinguishing Optimism from Neuroticism (and 
Trait Anxiety, Self-Mastery, and Self-Esteem) - a Reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test', Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), pp. 1063-1078. 
Sharot, T., Kanai, R., Marston, D., Korn, C. W., Rees, G. & Dolan, R. J. (2012) 'Selectively altering belief 
formation in the human brain', Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 109(42), pp. 17058-17062. 
Sharot, T., Korn, C. W. & Dolan, R. J. (2011) 'How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of 
reality', Nature Neuroscience, 14(11), p. 1475. 
Sharot, T., Riccardi, A. M., Raio, C. M. & Phelps, E. A. (2007) 'Neural mechanisms mediating optimism 
bias', Nature, 450(7166), pp. 102-105. 
Shepperd, J. A., Waters, E. A., Weinstein, N. D. & Klein, W. M. (2015) 'A primer on unrealistic optimism', 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(3), pp. 232-237. 
Singer, T., Critchley, H. D. & Preuschoff, K. (2009) 'A common role of insula in feelings, empathy and 
uncertainty', Trends Cogn Sci, 13(8), pp. 334-340. 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
23 
 
Strobel, A., Beauducel, A., Debener, S. & Brocke, B. (2001) 'A German Version of Carver and White's 
BIS/BAS Scales', Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 22(3), pp. 216-227. 
Strunk, D. R., Lopez, H. & DeRubeis, R. J. (2006) 'Depressive symptoms are associated with unrealistic 
negative predictions of future life events', Behaviour research and therapy, 44(6), pp. 861-882. 
Tenney, E. R., Logg, J. M. & Moore, D. A. (2015) '(Too) optimistic about optimism: the belief that 
optimism improves performance', J Pers Soc Psychol, 108(3), pp. 377-399. 
Trimmer, P. C. (2016) 'Optimistic and realistic perspectives on cognitive biases', Current Opinion in 
Behavioral Sciences, 12, pp. 37-43. 
van Dijk, W. W., van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Ouwerkerk, J. W. & Wesseling, Y. M. (2011) 'Self-esteem, 
self-affirmation, and schadenfreude', Emotion, 11(6), pp. 1445-1449. 
Volz, K. G., Kessler, T. & von Cramon, D. Y. (2009) 'In-group as part of the self: in-group favoritism is 
mediated by medial prefrontal cortex activation', Social neuroscience, 4(3), pp. 244-260. 
Von Collani, G. & Herzberg.Y (2003) 'Eine revidierte Fassung der deutschsprachigen Skala zum 
Selbstwertgefühl von Rosenberg', Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 24(1), pp. 
3-7. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A. & Tellegen, A. (1988) 'Development and validation of brief measures of positive 
and negative affect: the PANAS scales', J Pers Soc Psychol, 54(6), pp. 1063-1070. 
Weinstein, N. D. (1980) 'Unrealistic optimism about future life events', Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39(806-820). 
Windschitl, P. D. & Stuart, J. O. R. (2015) 'Optimism biases', The Wiley Blackwell handbook of judgment 
and decision making, pp. 431-455. 
Witten, D. M., Tibshirani, R. & Hastie, T. (2009) 'A penalized matrix decomposition, with applications to 
sparse principal components and canonical correlation analysis', Biostatistics, 10(3), pp. 515-534. 
Yang, J., Wei, D., Wang, K. & Qiu, J. (2013) 'Gray matter correlates of dispositional optimism: a voxel-
based morphometry study', Neurosci Lett, 553, pp. 201-205. 
Yoshimura, S., Okamoto, Y., Onoda, K., Matsunaga, M., Okada, G., Kunisato, Y., Yoshino, A., Ueda, K., 
Suzuki, S. & Yamawaki, S. (2014) 'Cognitive behavioral therapy for depression changes medial prefrontal 
and ventral anterior cingulate cortex activity associated with self-referential processing', Soc Cogn Affect 
Neurosci, 9(4), pp. 487-493. 
 
  
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
24 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Image of all eight included social optimism bias measures. One optimism bias was computed 
for each character as the difference between the average likelihood of desirable events minus the average 
likelihood of undesirable events. The warmth bias indicates the difference in optimism biases between 
warm (student, elderly) and cold (businessperson, alcoholic) characters. The magnitude of the optimism 
biases adds the optimism biases of the student, elderly, and businessperson characters and then subtracts 
the optimism bias of the alcoholic character, since that one – on average – is negative (i.e. is a pessimism 
bias). In addition, the average likelihoods were taken for all desirable and all undesirable events.   
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Figure 2. Optimism bias scores for the four social groups, calculated as the difference between the 
likelihood estimates for desirable events and undesirable events. The y axis represents this desirability 
bias, as the percentage difference between likelihood estimates for desirable scenarios as opposed to 
undesirable scenarios. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
  
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa095/5873241 by U
niversitaetsbibliothek Bern user on 21 July 2020
U
N
CO
RR
E
CT
E
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
 
26 
 
Figure 3. Depiction of results of the sparse canonical correlation analysis Mode 1. Left: List of all non-
imaging variables with weights above 0.2 in descending order. Middle: Scatterplot of both variates (x-
axis: cortical thickness, y-axis: non-imaging data) colored by the z-standardized warmth bias. Top right: 
Depiction of the weights of the brain regions with contributions toward the imaging variate above 0.2. 
Bottom right: List of these weights in descending order. Abbreviations: BFI = Big Five Inventory, COS = 
Comparative Optimism Scale, ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, PANAS = Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule, PFC = prefrontal cortex. 
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Table 1. Contribution weights of all non-imaging measures toward the non-imaging variates of Modes 1, 
2, and 6. 
 Weight Mode 1 Weight Mode 2 Weight Mode 6 
Task: Warmth bias 0.37 0.18 0.22 
BAS Total 0.35 0.05 -0.12 
COS Optimism 0.29 -0.13 -0.13 
PANAS Positive 0.25 -0.11 0.01 
BIS Total 0.23 0.18 -0.40 
BFI Neuroticism 0.21 0.23 -0.04 
ERQ Suppression 0.20 -0.13 0.14 
BFI Conscientiousness 0.20 0.04 -0.25 
ERQ Reappraisal 0.19 0.24 0.16 
Task: Undesirable events likelihood 
average 
0.18 0.21 -0.08 
LOT Optimism 0.09 -0.02 0.05 
BFI Extraversion 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 
Task: Student optimism bias 0.01 0.13 0.37 
Task: Elderly optimism bias 0.00 0.16 0.22 
RSES Total -0.03 0.20 0.27 
PANAS Negative -0.04 0.25 0.00 
LOT Pessimism -0.04 -0.13 -0.35 
BFI Openness -0.06 -0.16 0.01 
BFI Agreeableness -0.11 0.01 -0.09 
Task: Desirable events likelihood 
average 
-0.13 0.29 -0.01 
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COS Pessimism -0.22 0.39 -0.45 
Task: Business optimism bias -0.23 -0.36 0.06 
Task: Overall magnitude of 
optimism bias 
-0.25 0.41 0.15 
Task: Alcoholic optimism bias 0.37 -0.08 -0.08 
Note. Abbreviations: BAS = Behavioral Activation System Scale, BFI = Big Five Inventory, BIS = 
Behavioral Inhibition System Scale, COS = Comparative Optimism Scale, ERQ = Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire, LOT = Life Orientation Test, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, RSES =  
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.  
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